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Abstract
The common security criterion d in quantum key distribution is
taken to solve the universal composability problem in quantum key
distribution as well as providing good general quantitative security
guarantee. In this paper it is shown that these are a result of an
invalid interpretation of d. The general security significance of d is
analyzed in detail. The related issues of universality and attacker’s
side information are discussed.
PACS #: 03.67Dd
1 Introduction
There have been considerable theoretical and experimental developments on
the generation of a fresh (information-theoretically) secure key between two
users via a protocol of the BB84 type [1, 2]. The terminology of quantum key
distribution (QKD) has been used more often than not and we will take it
to be synonymous with quantum key generation, other terminology that has
been employed include quantum key agreement and quantum key expansion.
While there is another approach [3] to quantum key generation which does
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not involve information-disturbance tradeoff or intrusion level estimation, in
this paper the term QKD will refer to BB84, while “BB84” is used in a wide
sense that includes Ekert-type entanglement protocols as well as protocols
that utilize other states than number states. QKD is interesting because if
offers the possibility of fresh key generation with information-theoretic rather
than complexity-based security, and thus would survive future developments
in computational power including quantum computers.
A most important foundational problem in QKD is to develop neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for the security of QKD protocols via relevant
mathematical criteria. It is imperative that such a criterion must possess a
clear empirical or operational meaning that bears directly on the intuitive
but sufficiently precise notion of security a user would intend. In addition to
mathematical correctness, it is also imperative that the proof of an uncondi-
tional security claim includes all possible attacks Eve may launch consistent
with the model situation and the laws of physics and logic with all the side
information Eve may possess taken into account. The security criterion and
analysis must be scrutinized scrupulously, because, contrary to most other
problems in physics and other empirical sciences, the security conclusion can-
not be established by an experiment or a simulation. While it is in principle
possible but difficult to falsify a security conclusion by experiment or sim-
ulation, a direct analysis of the meaning of the criterion and whether all
side information has been accounted for is a more logically clear and direct
approach for ascertaining the validity of a security claim.
In this paper we carry out such an analysis for the so-called universality
security claim in QKD made via a criterion d in [4, 5]. The ordinary security
significance of this d apart from universality will also be analyzed. It is
important to scrutinize this criterion because it is currently the only one
under which universality has supposedly been proven, and the interpretation
given to it also makes it a very attractive security criterion in general. The
nature of these claims can be briefly summarized as follows.
When the two users generate a key K between themselves under the
criterion d ≤ ǫ, according to [4, 5, 6, 7] they would share a perfect key between
them with probability p that is at least 1− ǫ, i.e., with probability p ≥ 1− ǫ
the key K can be considered identical to a uniformly distributed bit string
U which is independent of whatever Eve has in possession. This is clearly a
very desirable state of affairs for ordinary security concerns if ǫ is sufficiently
small. With probability at least 1 − ǫ, it also clearly implies universality,
viz., it is secure in any arbitrary context. For instance, it guarantees that
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any bit of K remains perfectly secret even if some other part of K is given to
Eve. Thus, the so-called composition problem is solved from this universally
composable security where K remains secure in any subsequent use of it
in different contexts. This and similar possible interpretations of d will be
analyzed, both for the universality issue and for its usual security significance.
The related problem of Eve’s side information, in particular her knowledge
of the privacy amplification code and the error correcting code the users
employ will be brought to bear on the security issues. It is concluded that
d does not possess universality and security significance as the above claim
suggests, and not even in a weaker form. Thus, the universality problem is
still open in QKD, as is also the problem of a proper security criterion apart
from composability.
In Section 2 the general universality problem will be discussed, especially
in relation to d. In Section 3, the incorrect meanings of d will be analyzed,
with specific counter-examples given on the invalid inferences for the signif-
icance of d. In Section 4, some correct meanings of d are discussed and the
problem of its quantitative security guarantee is elaborated for realistic pro-
tocols. The general side information issue is commented on in section 5 and
some concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
2 Universal Composability and the
Criterion d
In a direct one-way BB84 protocol, a user Alice sends another user Bob a
sequence of random bits and they check a portion of it to assure that the
error rate (QBER) is below a given threshold. Then an error correcting code
(ECC) is employed on the rest, the sifted key, to obtain an error-free sequence
between them with high probability. The resulting error-corrected key, to be
called Kc, is passed through a hash function or privacy amplification code
(PAC) to further reduce Eve’s possible information with the final generated
key K as output. Eve attacks by setting her probe on the transmitted states
before they reach Bob, waiting to get all the public exchange between Alice
and Bob, and extracting her information on K by measuring her probes.
The generated n-bit K would have perfect security if it is uniformly dis-
tributed on the key space of 2n values and is independent of everything in
Eve’s possession. The composition problem arises that when K is used in a
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specific context, e.g., in one-time pad encryption of a new data string, Eve
may gain new information that may be combined with whatever in her pos-
session to yield possibly some information on K that she otherwise cannot
obtain. The prime example is how partial key leakage would affect the rest
of the key. When K is used as one-time pad, a known-plaintext attack would
reveal some of the bits exactly. The composition problem is then whether
these known bits of K would increase Eve’s information on the rest of K.
The additional quantum problem is that Eve may hold her probe in quantum
memory and choose the measurement with this side information and perhaps
be then able to unlock much new information she could not otherwise obtain.
It is crucially important that we be precise in what we are after in this
composition problem. Thus two important distinctions on such composition
issue would be made. First, it is clear that universality cannot obtain on
arbitrary side information that may bear on K, just classically. The side
information could be trivially what K itself turns out to be, as a specific k.
It could also be about how k was generated from a classical source, which
would reveal something about k. Even “arbitrary context of use” is too vague
as not all such contexts can be characterized, or at least it is not clear how
they may be characterized, by a single mathematical formulation, classically
or quantum mechanically. Until the side information Eve may possess is
explicitly specified, it is not possible to tell whether it may have something
to do with the otherwise uniform key to her. An explicit illustration with
the use of ECC and also PAC on Kc will be given in Section 5.
Thus, it is more appropriate to separate the composition problem by the
context in which K is actually used. Generally, partial key leakage is always
an important consideration because some information on part of K when
used as key can often be obtained by known-plaintext attacks also in other
than one-time pad application. One needs to assign a specific quantitative
measure on the “information about K” that is leaked. Typically it would
be some specific known bits in K or some Shannon information on K itself
directly. This leads us to the next point.
Secondly, there is a quantitative issue on how one wants to measure the
information leak. Just in classical statistics that not all unknown parameters
can be modeled as random variables, not all side information S is a random
variable to Eve. This may arise because S may take on too many, in fact
an infinite number of possible values with resulting infinite entropy, which
for example would be the case if S describes a complete procedure of how K
was physically generated. Assuming that S is a random variable, Eve could
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then possibly obtain information on K equal to H(S) when one measures
information by Shannon entropy H(·). However, if we fix attention on the
partial key leakage problem, it is the rest of the K that we are concerned
with. Thus, we have the following situation. Consider the example of a
two-bit K = (k1, k2) in which Eve knows k1 ⊕ k2. If k1 is revealed to her
she would know k2. On the other hand, she has one-bit information on K
to begin with. How do we want to measure the effect of one-bit leak in this
case? Eve has one bit to begin with and knows one bit afterward. Did she
learn anything new? The case for a long K is similar.
It seems it is meaningful to consider how much better Eve could tell the
rest of K from the other leaked portion of it as a quantitative measure of
composition security in this partial key leakage scenario, the comparison
being made between the same portion of the key before and after another
portion is leaked for a given quantitative measure. In the above two-bit
example, k2 by itself is completely random to Eve before she knows k1 but
it determines k2 with probability one. The key is therefore not PKL-secure,
a terminology we choose to denote security under partial key leakage. Any
quantitative measure of PKL-security can be introduced on the above basis
with different operational significance, but whatever it is, a uniform key
independent of Eve’s possession must have full PKL-security.
In the quantum case there is the additional issue of lockable information
[7], that a random variable side inforamtion S may reveal to Eve more than
H(S) bits of information onK which is impossible classically. From the above
two-bit example it may be seen that PKL-security may be related to how
much Eve knows about K before the leakage. In [8], it was suggested that
if Eve’s optimal mutual information on K, called the accessible information
Iacc, is exponentially small in n for large n, then the n-bit K is composition
secure according to their quantitative definition. While the mathematical
result in [8] is correct, it was pointed out in [7] via a counter-example with
one-time pad use of K that the result does not have the interpretation given
in [8] to guarantee their composition security.
Already in [4, 5], a criterion d was used to “establish” universality. This
d is actually also equivalent to one of several criteria discussed in [8]. Specif-
ically, let ρk
E
be the state in Eve’s possession conditioned on a generated key
value k, and let
ρU :=
1
|K|
∑
k
|k〉〈k| (1)
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be the completely mixed uniform state on the |K| = 2n orthonormal |k〉’s. It
is assumed that the “a priori” probability of K to Eve before she measures
on her probe is uniform. Then the security criterion d is the trace distance
d :=
1
2
‖ ρKE − ρU ⊗ ρE ‖1, (2)
where
ρKE :=
1
|K|
∑
k
|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρkE (3)
and
ρE :=
1
|K|
∑
k
ρkE. (4)
The trace distance ‖ ρ−σ ‖1 between two states is related to the classical
variational (statistical/Kolmogorov) distance δ(P,Q) between two probabil-
ity distributions as follows [4]. For any POVM or von Neumann measurement
made on ρ and σ with resulting distribution P and Q, ‖ ρ− σ ‖1≤ ǫ implies
δ(P,Q) ≤ ǫ where
δ(P,Q) :=
1
2
∑
x∈X
|P (x)−Q(x)|, (5)
and P,Q are over the same range X . Lemma 1 of [4, 9] states that for any
distributions P,Q, of random variables X,X ′, there exists a joint distribution
PXX′ such that the marginal distributions are PX = P, PX′ = Q, and
Pr[X 6= X ′] = δ(P,Q). (6)
From this result it is concluded [4], [5, Prop 2.1.1] that when d ≤ ǫ, with
probability p ≥ 1− ǫ the real and the ideal situation of perfect security can
be considered identical, where the ideal situation is one where K is replaced
by a uniformly distributed random variable U which is independent of ρk
E
.
This statement is repeatedly made [10] and provides the following two very
desirable consequences. Under d ≤ ǫ, with probability p ≥ 1 − ǫ the key K
is universally composable (or at least so for partial key leakage) and it is the
same as the uniform U case to Eve for usual security apart from composition.
Such a key is called ǫ-secure.
In the next section we will show that this conclusion is not valid and
neither is another related weaker one. The significance of d for both security
with and apart from composition will be analyzed in detail in section 4.
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3 Analysis of Criterion d: What d Does Not
Guarantee
Before we embark on a full analysis of the operational meaning and quanti-
tative significance of the criterion d, let us note the meaning of the various
quantum states involved. Eve’s k-dependent probe states ρk
E
and their av-
erage ρE have clear meanings. The key-determining state ρU is in Bob’s
possession, and we can make this simplification used in [7, 9, 11] for the
purpose of this paper instead of assigning first different keys kA and kB to
Alice and Bob as in [6]. Then the joint state ρKE of (3) on the state space
HB ⊗ HE shared between Bob and Eve component-wise is an idealization
that does not obtain in concrete realistic BB84 protocols. This is because
many classical and macroscopic subsystems intervene between Bob and Eve
and there is no single pure quantum state that governs both and known to
anyone. Even if ρk
E
is re-interpreted to denote the state outside of Bob’s
key-determining register, such an overall pure state still does not obtain in
a real protocol. On the other hand, if Bob only measures on the basis {|k〉}
which is so intended in all the previous references, there is no harm and is
perhaps mathematically convenient for some purpose to consider d in the
form of (2) involving the entangled state ρKE of (3). In this situation, since
Bob and Eve perform their “local” operations separately, the criterion d is
exactly equivalent to
d = Ek[‖ ρ
k
E
− ρE ‖1], (7)
which is a condition on HE alone. Equality of the right hand sides of (2) and
(7) follows from lemma 2 of ref. [4] directly, with Ek the average over the 2
n
possible values of K. The right-hand side of (7) is indeed one of the criteria
proposed in [8]. The entangled form (2) may give an illusion of being a more
general criterion, but under the conditions just described that Bob measures
only on the basis {|k〉}, it is actually not.
It is tempting, with the entangled form of d in (2), to consider ρKE as
close to the product state ρU ⊗ ρE when d is small. If one interprets d ≤ ǫ as
meaning that ρKE is “basically” ρU ⊗ ρE , e.g., ρKE is equal to ρU ⊗ ρE with
probability at least p ≥ 1− ǫ, then the criterion d has the great significance
discussed in Section 2 without any need for a justification via the variational
distance through (5)-(6). It would guarantee a uniform key U is obtained
with probability p ≥ 1 − ǫ which is universally composable with the same
probability, a quite satisfactory security situation when d is sufficiently small.
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Such an interpretation seems to be made in various places [10] directly from
the expression (2) independently of and in addition to the argument from
subsequent variational distance obtained from a measurement via (6).
However, as in the case of classical probability distributions, a single
number criterion (without coding a sequence into it) cannot so capture a
whole distribution or a quantum state. This is brought out in [3, 12] and will
be further discussed later. The small trace distance between two quantum
states ρ and σ does not imply ρ is “basically” σ – it is simply a numerical
measure that is useful for various purposes similar to δ(P,Q), but it does
not guarantee certain empirical meaning one may want to attribute to the
relation between ρ and σ. Similar to the case of Eve’s mutual information on
the key, the d ≤ ǫ or δE := δ(P, U) ≤ ǫ criterion is fine when ǫ is sufficiently
small. The serious problem is that for long bit sequences, they have to
be extremely small, as described in section 4. Thus, unless the previous
interpretation [10] holds the criterion does not provide adequate quantitative
security guarantee similar to the case of Eve’s mutual information per bit [3].
Unfortunately, the interpretation does not hold.
In the following we will analyze the significance of d and show that it is
does not have either of the following three consequences:
(i) Through (5)-(6), the generated key K is equal to a perfect key U with
probability p ≥ 1−d and is completely independent of Eve’s knowledge
and possessions.
(ii) With probability at least 1− d, ρKE is equal to ρU ⊗ ρE shared by Bob
and Eve.
(iii) Any probability distribution P Eve may obtain by a measurement on
the probe has δ(P, U) ≤ d for the uniform distribution U of the same
support as P .
In Section 4 the possible security significance of d in both the before-usage
and composition contexts will be explored.
The conclusion (i) above is explicitly asserted and “proved” as described
in section 2 of this paper, first in reference [4] and later repeated in many
other papers [10]. The proof relies on the existence of a joint distribution
that yields the marginal distributions P and Q and gives (6). However, to
the extent it makes sense to talk about such a joint distribution, (i) would
follow only if “there exists” is replaced by “for every”. This is because
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since there is no knowledge on such joint distribution, one cannot assume
the most favorable case via “there exists” for security guarantee or general
“interpretation” that ref. [4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11] give.
Indeed, it is not clear at all what realistic meaning can be given or claimed
for the realization of such a joint distribution, other than the independent
case PXX′ = P ·Q. In such case, even if both P and Q are the same uniform
distribution so that δ(P,Q) = 0, we have Pr[X 6= X ′] = 1 − 1
N
, N = 2n, and
the two sides of (6) are almost as far apart as they can be since both are
between 0 and 1. This provides a counter-example to the interpretation and
security guarantee.
Counter-Example to (i):
Let X and X ′ be independent in (6). Then (6) is violated (almost maxi-
mally).
Moving onto (ii), one may observe that ρKE cannot be “basically” the same
as ρU⊗ρE in general if ρU and ρE are “close” to pure states. In particular, an
actual product pure state ρU⊗ρE is not “basically” the same as an entangled
state ρKE of (3). The specific statement (ii) has the following consequence:-
ρKE = (1− d)ρU ⊗ ρE + dσKE (8)
for some state σKE and we have used a fixed d for simplicity instead of
carrying along d ≤ ǫ. The same (near)-pure states ρU and ρE falsifies (8)
in general. A specific numerical example would show (8) to be invalid as
follows.
Consider the binary case of one-bit k where conditioned on k ∈ {0, 1},
Eve has a pure probe state |k0〉 or |k1〉. It is readily computed that in this
case d = 1
4
‖ |k0〉〈k0| − |k1〉〈k1| ‖1, and is thus bounded between 0 and
1/2. If Eve makes the optimum binary quantum detection on her probe, her
probability of success is from [13]
Pc =
1
2
+ d. (9)
Under the hypothesis (8), we have from total probability decomposition,
Pc ≤ (1− d)
1
2
+ d · 1 =
1
2
+
d
2
. (10)
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An exact computation from (8) with
σKE = 2
−n
∑
k
|k〉〈k| ⊗ σk
E
(11)
shows that
Pc =
1
2
+
d
4
‖ σk0
E
− σk1
E
‖1 (12)
or Pc ≤ 1/2 + d/2 consistent with (10). Thus, the more secure scenario (8)
with Pc bounded by (10) contradicts the actual Pc of (9) obtainable in this
example.
The following counter-example specifically pertains to composition also.
Consider a two-bit K with
ρ00E = σ ⊗ ρ1, ρ
01
E = σ ⊗ ρ2 (13)
ρ10
E
= σ ⊗ ρ2, ρ
11
E
= σ ⊗ ρ1, (14)
for a fixed σ on the first qubit and general states ρ1, ρ2 on the second. It is
readily computed that for (13)-(14),
d =
1
4
‖ ρ1 − ρ2 ‖1 (15)
analogous to the above single-bit example. According to (ii), the whole 2-bit
sequence has a probability 1− d of being the uniform U , which implies that
with the same probability, knowledge of the first bit leak implies nothing
about the second, which cannot be determined by Eve with a success prob-
ability Pc > 1/2 + d/2 as in (10). On the other hand, it is evident from
(13)-(14) that knowledge of the first bit would imply the second bit can be
determined with success probability Pc = 1/2 + d as in (9). Thus, in this
example there is no quantitative PKL-security according to (ii), or from (i)
which gives the same quantitative guarantee as (ii). Combining these two
examples we have
Counter-Example to (ii):
Let ρk
E
be given by (13)-(14). Then the PKL-security for composition given
by (i) or (ii) is violated. Also, the single-bit security of the second bit by
itself violates (ii) as in (9).
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Finally, for (iii), we note that the condition δE := δ(P, U) = d has the
significance that for K with distribution P , any m-bit subsequence 1 ≤ m ≤
n, has a probability pm from P that satisfies [14]
|pm − 2
−m| ≤ d. (16)
Thus, a sufficiently small δE would have the desirable property of guaran-
teeing any deviation of K-subsequence probability from uniform to be small.
However, d ≤ ǫ does not imply (iii) on either a joint distribution from a
measurement on HB ⊗ HE or on Eve’s distribution from her measurement
on HE . This is because ρE is not generally the uniform state ρU even when
the range of {ρk
E
} has dimension exactly equal to |K| = 2n. In concrete
protocols, the dimension of ρk
E
would exceed |K| considerably, through key
sifting, error correction and privacy amplification. It does not seem possible
to have any state ρE that would yield the uniform distribution to E upon her
general or even just projection-valued measurements.
Counter-examples can be constructed easily on (iii) from ρE 6= ρU . We
can also have the same example (13)-(14) on (ii) on the distribution from
measuring on HE when σ = |a〉〈a| and Eve measures {|a〉, |b〉}, 〈a|b〉 = 0 on
the first probe qubit and the eigenvectors of ρ1 − ρ2 on the second. It is
readily computed that in this case
δE =
1
2
+ 2d, d ≥
1
4
(17)
= 1, d ≤
1
4
. (18)
Thus, δE ≤ d is not satisfied.
Counter-Example to (iii):
The above (17)-(18) or any ρE 6= ρU .
Note that δ(P,Q) ≤ ǫ does not imply that the distribution P is equal to
Q with probability p ≥ 1 − ǫ, similar to the case of ‖ ρ − σ ‖1≤ ǫ. That is,
the following is not a consequence of δ(P,Q) = ǫ from (5)
P (x) = (1− ǫ)Q(x) + ǫP ′(x), (19)
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where P ′ is a distribution on X [15]. Similar to the quantum case (8), under
(19) one may [16] infer that the distribution Q is obtained with probability
1− ǫ. The difference between the two is then:
(a) Under (19), the random variable X has the distribution Q with proba-
bility at least 1− ǫ.
(b) Under δ(P,Q) ≤ ǫ, |pm−qm| ≤ ǫ, where pm and qm are anym-subsequence
probabilities of the random vector X under P and Q.
For (a), with probability p ≥ 1− ǫ all subsequences of X have exactly the
probabilities given by qm. Under (b), each subsequence of X has probability
qm±ǫ. Not only is there a quantitative difference which we have discussed in
this section, there is a uniformity property for (a) that is not shared by (b).
The previous interpretation [10] is similar to (a) while only (b) holds. As we
have shown, such interpretation cannot be maintained. Indeed, it appears
counter-intuitive that with a high probability Eve knows exactly nothing
about the generated key, that not even a tiny amount of information could
be derived from her probe and public announcement.
4 Security Significance of d
The exact security significance of d with and without composition is analyzed
in the following. First we note the analog in δ of the equivalence between (2)
and (7) for uniformly distributed K,
Ek[δ(P
k
E
, PE)] = d, (20)
where d is now given by
d := δ(Pkk′, UkQk′). (21)
In (21), Pkk′ is the joint distribution of Bob’s measured key k and Eve’s mea-
surement result k′ on her probe ρk
E
, Uk the uniform distribution on k and Qk′
Eve’s distribution from measuring on ρE . The equality of (20) follows from
Pkk′ = Pk′|kUk in (21) with P
k
E
(k′) = Pk′|k and PE =
1
|K|
∑
k
Qk. Equation
(21) implies, from (16),
|Pkk′ − UkQk′| ≤ d. (22)
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There is no composition significance to d ≤ ǫ, from d ≤ ǫ, similar to that
of (i) or (ii) or (a) in section 3. Intuitively, d ≤ ǫ says from (22) that any
joint distribution Pkk′ is, up to d, given by the product distribution UkQk′ for
which Eve’s measurement would yield a k′ that is independent of the actual
k. Thus, her estimate of k has to come from her possible a priori information
on k and whatever is allowed through d of (21). However, the strongest way
this restriction comes about is in spelling out the definition of δ(P,Q) in
(20)-(21) and not from (22). Thus, (20) shows that only on average over K
is P k
E
carrying no information on k up to d, the individual (22) would yield a
useless |K|d constraint on Pk′|k for typically large |K|. The averaging allows
that for an individual k value the security could be much worse.
To explore further the significance of d ≤ ǫ or d ≤ ǫ, we strengthen (7) to
dk :=‖ ρ
k
E
− ρE ‖1≤ ǫ, ∀k. (23)
From the triangle inequality, it follows immediately from (23) that
‖ ρk1
E
− ρk2
E
‖1≤ 2ǫ, ∀k1, k2. (24)
For the composition problem, especially for PKL-security, knowledge of
a subsequence of K would restrict the possible k’s to a smaller set. Let k be
known and k′the remaining K. Then for each possible k′, the state ρkk
′
E
still
satisfies, from (23), ‖ ρkk
′
E
− ρE ‖1≤ ǫ. From (24) the trace distance between
any two such possible k’s remains bounded by the same 2ǫ. It may then be
inferred that partial key leakage has not affected the rest of K in so far as the
security conditions (23)-(24) are concerned. However, as discussed in section
2 it is k′, the rest of K, that matters in such context and k′ may be more
readily identifiable as follows.
Eve’s probability distribution from any measurement is now reduced from
2n to 2n−m possibilities when m bits are leaked. This would generally reduce
her error probabilities even under (23) or (24), although it is not guaranteed
to be so on a per bit basis when normalized relative to the n − m bit uni-
form distribution. In any event, a further specific quantitative measure that
has direct operational meaning, such as Eve’s success probability in identi-
fying k′, needs to be proposed and a general proof provided on how strong
the protocol is against partial key leakage. The previous conclusion of uni-
versal composability is so convenient due to the invalid conclusion that the
generated key is uniform and independent of Eve’s probe with probability
1− d.
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The condition (23) or (24) also implies that Eve’s discrimination of k
would be difficult for sufficiently small ǫ as all the ρk
E
are clustered together
closely. Good error probability estimates for the multiple quantum state
discrimination problem are available [17], but they do not cover the case
where the success probability is small. It appears interesting to relate (23)
or (24) to Eve’s optimal success probability of determining K, or parts of it,
which would provide clear security significance to dk ≤ ǫ. Such work could
be attempted both for before-usage security and for partial key leakage.
The criterion d ≤ ǫ is used in the security proof as follows. An ǫ-secure
key K of appropriate rate n/n0 is guaranteed from the measured QBER for
various protocols [4, 5, 6, 11] via bounds involving various ǫ-smooth entropies.
In [11], numerical plots on the original BB84 protocol are given for ǫ =
10−5 ∼ 2−16 and n0 > 10
4 with n/n0 > 0.1. These results do not rule out
very insecure possibilities as follows.
There is a serious quantitative problem of δE guarantee that applies to
even dk ≤ ǫ and assuming reduction of ρE to U can be achieved. It was
pointed out [3, 12] that under the constraint IE/n ≤ 2
−l for Eve’s mutual
information per bit IE/n onK, there are distributions onK Eve may possibly
obtain that gives her maximum probability p1 of identifying the whole key
K as p1 ∼ 2
−l. The same distribution gives
δE = 2
−l − 2−n, (25)
which is ∼ 2−l for l up to a good fraction of n. The subsequence of K may
be obtained with higher probability under the IE/n constraint but it satisfies
the more secure (16) under the δE constraint. Nevertheless, for l ∼ 10
2 or
smaller, a n = 103 key is far from “perfect” not only for the whole K but
also for many subsequences of K . In practice, only l ∼ 10 for IE/n has
been achieved experimentally [19] and it is not clear it can be made much
better for δE . The problem is that unless l ∼ m, the guarantee from (16) or
(25) that the m-subsequence probability pm ≤ 2
−l is far worse than that of
a uniform key K = U . Even if l ∼ 20 can be experimentally achieved, it is
quite poor for m ∼ 100 and n ≥ 100 as compared to a uniform key.
In this connection, it may be pointed out that the incorrect meaning as-
signed to d [10] makes the security situation appear much more favorable.
Indeed, it seems d = 2−l would play the same role as the message authen-
tication key of l bits used in creating the public channel, that except for a
probability p = 2−l the cryptosystem is secure. However, as a message au-
thentication key of l & 50 bits may be needed for say, n & 103 bits, a small
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l ∼ 20 is not really a good guarantee. It is important to note that many num-
bers involved in a concrete realistic protocol with n ≥ 100 are exponentially
small. It is necessary to compare two very small numbers carefully.
Note also that the average constraint d ≤ ǫ is much weaker than dk ≤ ǫ
of (23). From Markov’s inequality [18],
Pr[X ≥ δ] ≤ E[X ]/δ (26)
for a nonnegative valued random variable X , one may guarantee X ≥ δ with
a probability ǫ by imposing E[X ] ≤ ǫδ instead of just E[X ] ≤ ǫ. For concrete
protocol guarantee, a single application of (26) already severely strains the
numerical requirement for a given quantitative level. The situation becomes
much worse for multiple guarantees of the form (23) or (24).
In sum, we have shown that d does not have the meaning attributed
to it in the literature, while for concrete protocols its quantitative security
significance with and without composition does not seem to be much better
than the mutual information criterion.
5 Side Information
As discussed in Section 2, the composition problem involves side information
Eve may obtain depending on the exact context in which the key K is used.
There are similar side information even during protocol execution which Eve
obtains but is not accounted for in protocol security analysis. This is partly
due to the fact that the exact message authentication code for creating a
tamper-proof public channel, the error correcting code, as well as the privacy
amplification code are not usually precisely specified in security analysis, and
when they are, their specific character are not usually taken into account. We
will indicate some of the issues in this section which are related to our analysis
in this paper. We will not discuss the message authentication problem here,
except noting that the full specific details of the protocol could be exploited
by an attacker as the following discussion on ECC and PAC demonstrates.
In the criterion d of (2)-(4) the assumption is made that the a priori
distribution of the key K is uniform. However, the often suggested direct
use of an ECC on the key KC to be corrected after sifting and testing would
bias the a priori probability. This is because an ECC would “decode” Kc to
a message, but only perfect codes [20] would have equal size decision regions
that are needed to assure equal a priori probabilities for the different K
15
values. However, perfect codes are rare and none is a good candidate for a
concrete protocol, while the relative sizes of the decision regions with any
decoding rule for common ECC’s have not been studied in coding theory.
This problem does not arise when the Kc is used as additive noise to a
uniformly chosen codeword.
Similarly, a matrix is typically chosen as a PAC, say an m × n Toeplitz
matrix that belongs to a “universal class” [4, 5]. However, a singular matrix
would leak information to Eve even if the original bit sequence to be com-
pressed is perfect. Indeed, in the binary case a rank m−r matrix would leak
r bits of Shannon information to Eve as a linear combination of the n bits
that gives a 0 would leak one bit of information. This problem has not been
dealt with in the literature.
In particular, eq. (11) in ref [4] cannot guarantee an ǫ-secure key for any
given universal hash function. At best it could only do that when averaged
over such functions. Even then it is rather amazing to have automatically
such guarantee on a universal family of Toeplitz matrices that has many
singular members. In any event, another application of Markov Inequality
for individual guarantee is necessary in this case if one does not analyze
further the proportion of singular matrices in a Toeplitz family.
The point here is that unless the full protocol is specified, one would not
be able to tell how Eve may utilize any side information to obtain further
information on the generated key. In particular, universality is too vague
to allow a complete mathematical characterization and each specific context
such as partial key leakage should be analyzed individually.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that the criterion d, the seemingly most potent criterion that
has so far appeared in the QKD literature, does not solve the composability
problem such as partial key leakage. Its empirical and quantitative signifi-
cance has been analyzed in detail, and found to be different from what it is
so far taken to be. Not only does it not guarantee the generated key K is
uniformly distributed and independent of the attacker’s probe with a high
probability, it also does not guarantee the variational distance δE = δ(P, U)
between the attacker’s possible distribution P on K and the uniform distri-
bution U is small. Furthermore, it appears very difficult for d to provide
adequate quantitative security guarantee through its legitimate meaning for
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concrete realistic protocols, similar to the situation of the attacker’s mutual
information per bit criterion [3]. The general issue of side information that
Eve may obtain is also discussed in relation to both universality and general
quantitative security. It appears there are much to be elaborated on QKD se-
curity analysis in regard to both the empirical significance of security criteria
and their quantitative adequacy in concrete realistic protocols.
7 Acknowledgement
I would like to thank R. Nair, M. Raginsky, and R. Renner for useful discus-
sions. This work was supported by AFOSR.
References
[1] C.H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. on Computers,
Systems, and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE, Los Alamitos,
CA), 175-179 (1984).
[2] A general review can be found in N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, H.
Zbinden, Rev. Mod. Phys. 74, 145-195 (2002).
[3] H.P. Yuen, to appear in IEEE J. Sel. Top. in Quantum Electronics, also
arXiv: http://arxiv.org/abs/0906.5241
[4] R. Renner, and R. Konig, Second Theory of Cryptography Conference
(TCC), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3378 (Springer, New
York, 2005), pp. 407-425.
[5] R. Renner, Int. J. Quant. Inf. 6, 1 (2008); also arxiv.org:
quant-ph/0512258.
[6] R. Renner, N. Gisin, and B. Kraus, Phys. Rev. A 72, 012332 (2005).
[7] R. Konig, R. Renner, A. Bariska, and U. Maurer, Phys. Rev. Lett. 98,
140502 (2007).
[8] M. Ben-Or, M. Horodecki, D. W. Leung, D. Mayers, and J. Oppenheim,
Second Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC), Lecture Notes in
Computer Science Vol. 3378 (Springer, New York, 2005), pp. 386406.
17
[9] R. Konig, U. Maurer, and R. Renner, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 51
(2005), p. 2381-2401.
[10] This is explicitly stated in [4] – p. 14, [5] – Section 2.2.2, [6] –p. 012332-5,
[7]–p. 140502-3, [11], p. 200501 -2.
[11] V. Scarani and R. Renner, Phys. Rev. Lett. 100, 200501 (2008).
[12] H.P. Yuen in: O. Hirota, J.H. Shapiro, M. Sasaki (Eds.), Proceedings of
the QCMC, NICT Press, 2006, p. 163.
[13] C.W. Helstrom, Quantum Detection and Estimation Theory, Academic
Press, New York (1976).
[14] M.A. Nielsen and I.L. Chuang, Quantum Computation and Quantum
Information, Cambridge University Press, 2000; p. 401.
[15] A specific counter-example was provided to the author by R. Renner.
[16] There is the subtle issue of ensemble identity similar to the ”partition
ensemble fallacy” in quantum mechanics that may cast doubt on such
inference on distributions, which we do not enter into here.
[17] J. Tyson, J. Math. Phys. 50, 062102 (2009).
[18] T.M. Cover and J.A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory, Wiley,
1991.
[19] J. Hasegawa, M. Hayashi, T. Hiroshima, A. Tomita, Asian Conference
on Quantum Information Science 2007, Shiran-kaikan, Kyoto, Sep.3-6,
(2007).
[20] F.J. MacWilliams and N.J.A. Sloane, The Theory of Error Correcting
Codes, New York, Elsevier/North Holland, 1977.
18
